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I
INTRODUCTION
In the past several years, Argentina, Cambodia, Chile, El Salvador, Guate-
mala, Haiti, Uruguay, and South Africa have each granted amnesty1 to mem-
bers of the former regime that commanded death squads that tortured and
killed thousands of civilians within their respective countries.2  With respect to
four of these countries (Cambodia, El Salvador, Haiti, and South Africa), the
United Nations pushed for, helped negotiate, and/or endorsed the granting of
amnesty as a means of restoring peace and democratic government.3  At the
preparatory conference for the establishment of a permanent international crimi-
nal court in August 1997, the U.S. Delegation circulated a paper suggesting that
the proposed permanent court should take into account such amnesties in the in-
terest of international peace and national reconciliation when deciding whether
to prosecute.4
Numerous scholars have made the case against granting amnesty to those
who commit violations of international humanitarian law (the laws of war), or
who commit other serious human rights crimes (genocide, torture, and crimes
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1. The term “amnesty” is derived from the Greek word “amnestia,” which means forgetfulness
or oblivion. See Norman Weisman, A History and Discussion of Amnesty, 4 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 520, 520 (1972).  Amnesty is an act of sovereign power “decriminalizing” a past offense.  See
Progress Report on the Question of the Impunity of Perpetrators of Human Rights Violations, Commis-
sion on Human Rights, July 19, 1993, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/6, at 12. Amnesty is generally ex-
ercised on behalf of certain classes of persons who are subject to trial but have not yet been prosecuted
or convicted. A pardon is to be contrasted from amnesty in that it does not overlook the offense or ex-
punge the conviction.  See Weisman, supra, at 530.
2. See Naomi Roht-Arriaza, State Responsibility to Investigate and Prosecute Grave Human
Rights Violations in International Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 451, 458-61, 484 n.187 (1990); Michael P.
Scharf, Swapping Amnesty for Peace: Was There a Duty to Prosecute International Crimes in Haiti?, 31
TEXAS INT’L L.J. 1, 15-18 (1996).
3. See Michael Vickery & Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Human Rights in Cambodia, in IMPUNITY AND
HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 251 (Naomi Roht-Arriaza ed., 1995).
4. See ICC PrepCon—August 1997, U.S. Delegation Draft (Rev.), on file with author.
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against humanity).5  Specifically, prosecuting the perpetrators of such crimes is
seen as necessary to discourage future offenses, deter vigilante justice, promote
reconciliation, and reinforce respect for the law and the new democratic re-
gime.6  Yet, according to the U.S. State Department, these policies must be bal-
anced against the need to close “a door on the conflict of a past era” and “to
encourage the surrender or reincorporation of armed dissident groups,” which
can facilitate the transition to democracy.7
Before weighing the policies for and against granting amnesty in any given
case, government and international organization officials must first determine
whether there exists an international law obligation to prosecute the particular
offense.  It is one thing to suggest that in a given case the decision not to prose-
cute violators represented a poor policy judgment; it is quite another to con-
clude that such a decision violated international law.  Were such a conclusion
possible, the decision to forego prosecution could be challenged before domes-
tic courts8 or in international fora.9  In addition, given the role of the United
Nations in some of these cases, such a determination would seriously damage
the credibility of the United Nations as an institution committed to the rule of
law.10  Finally, it would be highly inappropriate for an international criminal court
to defer to a national amnesty in a situation where the amnesty violates obliga-
tions contained in the very international conventions that make up the court’s
subject matter jurisdiction.
                                                          
5. See generally ASPEN INST., STATE CRIMES: PUNISHMENT OR PARDON—PAPERS AND REPORT
OF THE CONFERENCE (1989).
6. See Id.
7. ICC PrepCon, supra note 4, at 1.
8. When Salvadoran citizens brought suit before domestic courts in an attempt to have the El
Salvador amnesty law declared invalid, the Supreme Court of Justice of El Salvador ruled that the
granting of amnesty in these circumstances constituted a political question that the courts lacked com-
petence to address.  See El Salvador: Supreme Court of Justice Decision on the Amnesty Law, Pro-
ceedings No. 10-93 (May 20, 1993), reprinted in 3 TRANSNATIONAL JUSTICE: HOW EMERGING
DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FORMER REGIMES 549 (Neil Kritz ed., 1995).  However, the issue be-
fore the Court was the constitutionality of the amnesty law in relation to the powers of legislature, not
whether the amnesty law was invalid as a violation of international law.  Indeed, the Court made clear
that “there are cases where there is constitutional jurisdictional control over amnesty, and it is the
competence of the Constitutional Chamber to pronounce itself over its [merits or lack of merits] ab
initio, or to initiate proceedings, in accordance [with] the case, inasmuch they are filed before the
Chamber.”   Id.
9. “Challenges to amnesty laws enacted in Argentina, El Salvador, Suriname, and Uruguay have
been lodged with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American
States.”  Dianne Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a
Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2540 n.5 (1991).
10. Article I (1) of the U.N. Charter provides:
The Purposes of the United Nations are … to maintain international peace and security, and
to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to
the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to
bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and interna-
tional law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead
to a breach of the peace.
U.N. CHARTER art.1, para. 1 (emphasis added).
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II
SOURCES OF AN OBLIGATION TO PROSECUTE
A. Crimes Defined in International Conventions
The prerogative of a state to issue an amnesty for an offense can be circum-
scribed by treaties to which the state is a party.  As Article 27 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties provides, “[a] party may not invoke the
provisions of its internal law as justification for failure to perform a treaty.”11
There are several international conventions that clearly provide for a duty to
prosecute the humanitarian or human rights crimes defined therein.  Of par-
ticular note are the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the Genocide Convention,
and the Torture Convention.  When these Conventions are applicable, the
granting of amnesty to persons responsible for committing the crimes defined
therein would constitute a breach of a treaty obligation for which there can be
no excuse or exception.  It is noteworthy, however, that these Conventions
were all negotiated in the context of the cold war and by design apply only to a
narrow range of situations.
1. The 1949 Geneva Conventions.  The four Geneva Conventions were ne-
gotiated in 1949 to codify the international rules relating to the treatment of
prisoners of war and civilians in occupied territory.  The Geneva Conventions
are among the most widely ratified treaties in the world.12 Each of the Conven-
tions contains a specific enumeration of “grave breaches,” which are war crimes
under international law for which there is individual criminal liability and for
which states have a corresponding duty to prosecute.13 Grave breaches include
willful killing, torture, or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments,
willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, extensive
destruction of property not justified by military necessity, willfully depriving a
civilian of the rights of a fair and regular trial, and unlawful confinement of a
civilian.14
                                                          
11. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27 (entered
into force for Haiti on Jan. 27, 1990), reproduced in BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW: SELECTED DOCUMENTS 55 (1995).
12. As of February 1, 1994, 185 states were party to the Geneva Conventions.  See Carla Edelen-
bos, Human Rights Violations: A Duty To Prosecute?,  7 LEIDEN J. INT’L L., Autumn 1994, at 5, 12
n.21.
13. See VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN INSIDER’S GUIDE TO THE INTERNA-
TIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 64-65 (1995).
14. See Article 50 of the Geneva Convention For the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 311, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75
U.N. T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva Convention I]; Article 51 of the Geneva Convention for the Amelio-
ration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention II];
Article 130 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III]; and Article 147
of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV].
SCHARF.FMT 04/03/98  10:41 AM
44 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 59:  No. 4
Parties to the Geneva Conventions have an obligation to search for, prose-
cute, and punish perpetrators of grave breaches of the Conventions unless they
choose to hand over such persons for trial by another state party.15 The Com-
mentary to the Conventions, which is the official history of the negotiations
leading to the adoption of these treaties,16 confirms that the obligation to prose-
cute is “absolute,” meaning, inter alia, that states parties can under no circum-
stances grant perpetrators immunity or amnesty from prosecution for grave
breaches.17
The duty to prosecute is, however, limited to the context of international
armed conflict.18 There are two reasons why the Geneva Conventions would
not, therefore, apply to the above cited examples of countries that refused to
prosecute persons responsible for atrocities.  First, there is a high threshold of
violence necessary to constitute a genuine armed conflict, as distinct from lower
level disturbances such as riots or isolated and sporadic acts of fighting.19 Sec-
ond, the violence in those countries did not have an international character as
recognized by the Geneva Conventions.  The international conflict requirement
derives from common article 2 of the four Conventions, which describes such
conflicts as cases of declared war or any other armed conflict that may arise be-
tween two or more of the contracting powers, even if the state of war is not
recognized by one of them, and cases of partial or total occupation of the terri-
tory of the contracting party, even if such occupation meets no armed resis-
tance.20
2. The Genocide Convention.  The Genocide Convention entered into
force on January 12, 1952, and has been widely ratified.21 Like the Geneva
Conventions, the Genocide Convention provides an absolute obligation to
prosecute persons responsible for genocide as defined in the Convention.22 The
                                                          
15. Geneva Convention I, supra note 14, art. 51; Geneva Convention II, supra note 14, art. 52;
Geneva Convention III, supra note 14, art. 131; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 14, art. 148.
16. According to Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, “[r]ecourse may be
had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the
circumstances of its conclusion, in order to … determine the meaning” when the text of a treaty provi-
sion “leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure.”  U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/27 (May 23, 1969), reprinted
in 63 AM. J. INT’L L. 875 (1969).
17. See MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 13, at 114 n.356 and accompanying text, 341; see also
THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY LAW 215 (1989)
(Geneva Conventions not subject to derogation).
18. See  Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case IT-94-1-T, Decision on Jurisdiction 68 (Oct. 2, 1995); see also 1
MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 13, at 54, 64-65, 114 n.356.  But see Jordan J. Paust, Applicability of
International Criminal Laws to Events in the Former Yugoslavia, 9 AM. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 499, 511-12
(1994) (arguing that serious violations of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, which applies
to internal armed conflict, can also be deemed “grave breaches” carrying the duty to prosecute).
19. See THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNAL STRIFE: THEIR INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTION 46 (1987).  For a discussion of the historical development of the notions of “war” and
“armed conflict,” see Werner Meng, War, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 282
(1982); Karl Josef Partsch, Armed Conflict, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
249 (1992).
20. See Article 2 of Geneva Conventions I, II, III, and IV, supra note 14.
21. As of December 31, 1993, 112 states were parties.  See Edelenbos, supra note 12, at 5, 6.
22. Article 4 of the Genocide Convention states: “Persons committing genocide or any of the
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Convention defines genocide as one of the following acts when committed
“with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or
religious group, as such”:
(a)  Killing members of the group;
(b)  Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c)  Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d)  Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e)  Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.23
The Genocide Convention contains two limitations that rendered it inappli-
cable to most of the above cited cases.  First, the Convention applies only to
those who have the specific intent literally to destroy a substantial portion of
the population of a target group.24  Second, the victims must constitute one of
the groups enumerated in the Genocide Convention, namely, national, ethnic,
racial, or religious.  In this respect, it is noteworthy that the drafters of the
Genocide Convention deliberately excluded acts directed against “political
groups” from the Convention’s definition of genocide.25
3. The Torture Convention.  The Torture Convention entered into force on
June 26, 1987, and currently has only 79 parties.26  The Convention defines
“torture” as
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally
inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person infor-
mation or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed
or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person,
or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is
                                                          
other acts enumerated in article 3 shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rul-
ers, public officials or private individuals.”  Convention on the Crime of Genocide, 9 December 1948,
78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention].  Article 5 requires states to “provide effective
penalties” for persons guilty of genocide.  Genocide Convention art. V.
23. Id. art. II.
24. See JASON S. ABRAMS & STEVE R. RATNER, STRIVING FOR JUSTICE: ACCOUNTABILITY AND
THE CRIMES OF THE KHMER ROUGE 39 (1995) (unpublished State Department Report which con-
cludes that “most commentators assert that the number of individuals intended to be destroyed must
be substantial, in light of the Convention’s emphasis on acts against large numbers, rather than indi-
viduals).
25. The exclusion of “political groups” was due in large part to the fact that the Convention was
negotiated during the Cold War, when the Soviet Union and other totalitarian governments feared
that they would face interference in their internal affairs if genocide were defined to include acts
committed to destroy political groups.  According to Professor Kuper, “one may fairly say that the
delegates, after all, represented governments in power, and that many of these governments wished to
retain an unrestricted freedom to suppress political opposition.”  LEO KUPER, GENOCIDE:  ITS
POLITICAL USE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 30 (1982).
26. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punish-
ment, opened for signature Feb. 4, 1985, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51
(1984), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984), as modified, 24 I.L.M. 535 (1984) (entered into force June
26, 1987) [hereinafter Torture Convention]; see Edelenbos, supra note 12, at 5, 7 (reporting that on
December 31, 1993, 79 states were party to the Convention).
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inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public of-
ficial or other person acting in an official capacity.  It does not include pain or suffer-
ing arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.27
Many of the brutal atrocities committed in the countries listed above would fall
within this definition.
The Torture Convention requires each state party to ensure that all acts of
torture are offenses under its internal law,28 establish its jurisdiction over such
offenses in cases where, inter alia, the alleged offender is a national of the
state,29 and if such a state does not extradite the alleged offender, the Conven-
tion requires it to submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose
of prosecution.30  Several commentators have argued that the peculiar wording
of the Torture Convention might allow for some types of amnesties, whereas
the Genocide Convention contains a more air-tight obligation to prosecute and
punish.31  The argument focuses on the fact the Genocide Convention requires
that persons who commit genocide “shall be punished” and requires states to
“provide effective penalties,”32 while the Torture Convention requires only that
states “submit” cases involving allegations of torture to the “competent
authorities for the purpose of prosecution” and merely requires the state to
make torture “punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account
their grave nature.”33  Thus, the Torture Convention, these commentators as-
sert, “does not explicitly require that a prosecution take place, let alone that
punishment be imposed and served.”34
Such an argument misconstrues the nature of the “prosecute or extradite”
formulation used in the Torture Convention, which is reproduced verbatim in
several other modern international criminal conventions.35  The Torture Con-
vention was carefully worded to reflect the developments in international stan-
dards of due process that had occurred in the nearly forty years since the
                                                          
27. Torture Convention, supra note 26, art. 1.
28. See id. art. 4.  The Article also requires parties to criminalize acts which “constitute[] complic-
ity or participation in torture.”  Id.
29. See id. art. 5.
30. See id. art. 7.
31. See  Orentlicher, supra note 9, at 2604; Jose Zalaquett, Confronting Human Rights Violations
Committed by Former Governments: Principles Applicable and Political Constraints, in STATE CRIMES:
PUNISHMENT OR PARDON 42 (1989).
32. See Genocide Convention, supra note 22, arts. 4, 5.
33. See Torture Convention, supra note 26, arts. 7(1), 4(2).
34. Orentlicher, supra note 9, at 2604.
35. See, e.g., Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 22 U.S.T. 1641,
T.I.A.S. No. 7192, 860 U.N.T.S. 105 (signed Dec. 16, 1970; entered into force Oct. 14, 1971); Conven-
tion for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 24 U.S.T. 565, T.I.A.S.
No. 7570, 974 U.N.T.S. 177 (signed Sept. 23, 1971; entered into force Jan. 26, 1973); Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic
Agents, 28 U.S.T. 1975, T.I.A.S. No. 8532, 1015 U.N.T.S. 243 (signed Dec. 14, 1973; entered into force
Feb. 20, 1977); International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, G.A. Res. 34/146, 34 U.N.
GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46 at 245, U.N. Doc. A/34/146 (1979) (signed Dec. 17, 1979; entered into
force June 4, 1983), reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1456 (1979); Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, Rome, Mar. 10, 1988, and the Protocol for the Sup-
pression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf,
Rome, Mar. 10, 1988, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 668 (1988).
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Genocide Convention was drafted in 1948.  Of particular importance was the
adoption in 1966 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
which obligates states to ensure the rights of criminal defendants, including
“the right to be presumed innocent,” and the right “to take proceedings before
a court, in order that that court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of
his detention and order his release if the detention is not lawful.”36  To be con-
sistent with these rights, the Torture Convention had to be worded in such a
way as to avoid the suggestion of a predetermined outcome of the judicial pro-
ceedings, and to recognize that there are legitimate reasons for the termination
of an investigation or the dismissal of a case prior to trial.37
Nor should any significance be assigned to the slight difference in the
wording of the two conventions’ punishment clauses.  The manifest intent of
both conventions was to ensure that persons convicted of genocide or torture
serve harsh sentences.  In the view of the Torture Convention’s drafters, “[i]n
applying article 4 [, which requires states to make torture ‘punishable by ap-
propriate penalties which take into account their grave nature,’] it seems rea-
sonable to require that the punishment for torture should be close to the penal-
ties applied to the most serious offenses under the domestic legal system.”38
Thus, this wording of the Torture Convention should not be construed to sug-
gest the permissibility of amnesties or pardons.
Unfortunately, the majority of countries in the world (including most of
those cited above) are not party to the Torture Convention.  Still, some might
argue that the Convention is nonetheless relevant based on the Committee
Against Torture’s 1990 decision concerning the Argentinean amnesty laws.  In
that case, the Committee Against Torture, which is the treaty body created by
the Torture Convention to facilitate its implementation, decided that commu-
nications submitted by Argentinean citizens on behalf of their relatives who
had been tortured by Argentinean military authorities were inadmissible since
Argentina had ratified the Convention only after the amnesty laws had been
enacted.  However, in dictum, the Committee stated, “Even before the entry
into force of the Convention against Torture, there existed a general rule of in-
ternational law which should oblige all states to take effective measures to pre-
vent torture and to punish acts of torture.”39
The Committee’s statement should not be mistakenly construed as sug-
gesting that amnesties for persons who commit torture are invalid under cus-
tomary international law.  By using the word “should,” the Committee indi-
                                                          
36. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171,  arts. 9(4), 14(2).  The International Covenant has been adopted by more than 100 states.
See LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 610 (3d ed. 1993).
37. See Orentlicher, supra note 9, at 2604 n.306.
38. J. HERMAN BURGERS & HANS DANELIUS, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST
TORTURE:  A HANDBOOK ON THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN,
OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT 129 (1988).
39. Decision on Admissibility, dated November 23, 1989, Regarding Communications nos. 1/1988,
2/1988 and 3/1988 (O.R., M.M. and M.S. v. Argentina), Report of the Committee Against Torture, U.N.
GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No. 44, at annex VI, U.N. Doc. A/45/44, at 111 (1990).
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cated that its statement was aspirational rather than a declaration of binding
law.  On the basis of its decision, the Committee urged Argentina to provide
remedies for the victims of torture and their surviving relatives; it did not sug-
gest that international law required that Argentina do so.40  Nor did it specify
that the remedy should be prosecution of those responsible, rather than some
other appropriate remedy such as compensation.  The Committee’s decision,
therefore, can not be read as indicating that the Torture Convention requires
non-parties to prosecute those who commit torture.
B. General Human Rights Conventions
Unlike the international criminal conventions discussed above, “general
human rights conventions” such as the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights,41 the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,42 and the American Convention on Human
Rights43 are silent about a duty to punish violations of the rights they were de-
signed to protect.  These general human rights conventions do, however, obli-
gate states to “ensure” the rights enumerated therein.
Some commentators take the position that the duty to ensure rights implies
a duty to prosecute violators.44  To support their position, the commentators
point to the “authoritative interpretations” rendered by the Human Rights
Committee, which was established to monitor compliance with the Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights.45  The Committee is empowered to comment on
communications received from individuals who are from states that have rati-
fied the Optional Protocol to the Covenant and who claim to have suffered a
violation of any of the rights protected by the Covenant.46  Three communica-
tions issued by the Committee have been cited as particularly noteworthy:  In
response to a communication alleging acts of torture in Zaire, the Committee
issued a comment stating that Zaire was “under a duty to … conduct an inquiry
into the circumstances of [the victim’s] torture, to punish those found guilty of
torture and to take steps to ensure that similar violations do not occur in the fu-
                                                          
40. See id.
41. Adopted Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
42. Signed Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, Europ. T.S. No. 5 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953).
43. Adopted Jan. 7, 1970, O.A.S. Official Records, OEA/ser.K/XVI/1.1, doc. 65 rev. 1, corr. 1
(1970), reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970).
44. See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 2, at  467; Orentlicher, supra note 9, at 2568; Thomas Buergen-
thal, To Respect and To Ensure: State Obligations and Permissible Derogations, in THE INTERNA-
TIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS:  THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 77 (Louis Henkin ed.,
1981) (noting that the “obligation to ‘ensure’ rights creates affirmative obligations on the state—for
example, to discipline its officials”); Yoram Dinstein, The Right to Life, Physical Integrity, and Liberty,
in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS 119 (noting that parties to the Covenant arguably must ex-
ercise due diligence to prevent intentional deprivation of life by individuals, “as well as to apprehend
murderers and to prosecute them in order to deter future takings of life”).
45. See, e.g., Orentlicher, supra note 9, at 2568; Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Sources in International
Treaties of an Obligation to Investigate, Prosecute, and Provide Redress, in IMPUNITY AND HUMAN
RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 28-30 (Naomi Roht-Arriaza ed., 1995).
46. See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res.
2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 59, art. 1, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
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ture.”47  In response to a communication alleging extra-legal executions in Suri-
nam, the Committee urged the government “to take effective steps … to inves-
tigate the killings … [and] to bring to justice any persons found to be responsi-
ble.”48  And in a case involving disappearances (forced abductions by state
agents followed by denials of knowledge of the victims’ whereabouts) in Uru-
guay, the Committee concluded that the government of Uruguay should take
effective steps to bring to justice any persons found responsible.49
In addition, the Human Rights Committee periodically adopts “General
Comments” elaborating the nature of States Parties’ obligations under par-
ticular articles of the Covenant.  In 1992, the Committee issued a general com-
ment asserting that amnesties covering acts of torture “are generally incom-
patible with the duty of States to investigate such acts; to guarantee freedom
from such acts within their jurisdiction; and to ensure that they do not occur in
the future.”50
The authoritative interpretation rationale is based on the notion that Par-
ties to the Covenant, having undertaken the treaty obligations contained
therein, are subsequently bound to accept, for the purposes of interpreting
these obligations, the interpretations rendered by the Human Rights Commit-
tee.51  This rationale, however, is a bit of an overstretch.  During the negotia-
tions of the Covenant, the delegates specifically considered and rejected a pro-
posal that would have required states to prosecute violators.52  To read in such a
requirement on the basis of the Human Rights Committee’s comments would
be to contravene the understanding of the Conventions’ drafters upon which
the majority of Parties relied when ratifying the Convention.  Nevertheless, an
increasing number of commentators, as well as the states-parties themselves,
seem to consider the Committee’s comments as Covenant jurisprudence, and
the countries that have more recently ratified the Covenant enter the system
with full knowledge of this jurisprudence and an awareness that the Cold War
context of the legislative history is increasingly obsolete.53
Although the Human Rights Committee’s pronouncements suggest a duty
for the state to do something to give meaning to the rights enumerated in the
Covenant, a careful reading of the Committee’s comments reveals that the
Committee never actually concluded that there was an obligation to prosecute
attendant to the duty to ensure the rights provided in the Covenant.  Rather,
                                                          
47. Muteba v. Zaire, Comm. No. 124/1982, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 40) Annex XIII, U.N. Doc.
A/39/40 (1984).
48. Boaboeram v. Surinam, Comm. Nos. 146/1983 and 148-154/1983, 40 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
40) Annex X, ¶ 13.2, U.N. Doc. A/40/40 (1985).
49. See Quinteros v. Uruguay, Comm. No. 107/1981, 38 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 40) Annex XXII,
U.N. Doc. A/38/40 (1983).
50. General Comment No. 20 (44) (article 7), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C21/Rev.1/Add.3, para. 15 (April
1992).
51. Cf. BRUNO SIMMA, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 223 (1995).
52. See U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n on Hum. Rts., 6th Sess., 195th Mtg. at 6, ¶ 24, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/SR.195 (1950).
53. See Orentlicher, supra note 9, at 2568; Naomi Roht-Arriaza, supra note 45, at  28-30.
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the Committee “urged” Surinam to prosecute and said that Uruguay “should”
bring violators to justice.  Nor did the Committee state that Zaire had to under-
take criminal prosecutions, but only that it had a duty to somehow punish those
found guilty by an inquiry, thereby leaving the door open to alternative meas-
ures such as dismissal from the military or loss of military rank, canceling gov-
ernment pensions, banning the perpetrator from public office, and/or requiring
the payment of damages through administrative fines or civil proceedings.  The
Committee’s 1992 general comment is consistent with this interpretation.  By
stating that amnesties “are generally incompatible,” the Committee implied
that some amnesties—for example, those that are accompanied by investiga-
tions to document abuses and identify perpetrators, purging the perpetrators
from positions of authority, and providing victim compensation—would be ac-
ceptable.
The authoritative interpretation rationale has more weight as applied to the
decisions rendered by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights interpreting
the American Convention on Human Rights.  Commentators who argue that a
duty to prosecute violators must be read into the American Convention have
pointed to the Court’s “landmark decision” in the Valasquez Rodriguez Case54
to support their position.55  That case concerned the unresolved disappearance
of Manfredo Valasquez in September 1981.  The Court heard testimony indi-
cating that he had been tortured and killed by Honduran security forces.
Writing of the duty under Article 1(1) of the American Convention to “ensure”
rights set forth in the Convention, the court stated,
This obligation implies the duty of the States Parties to organize the governmental
apparatus and, in general, all the structures through which public power is exercised,
so that they are capable of juridically ensuring the free and full enjoyment of human
rights.  As a consequence of this obligation, the States must prevent, investigate and
punish any violation of the rights recognized by the Convention and, moreover, if
possible attempt to restore the right violated and provide compensation as warranted
for damages resulting from the violation.56
The Court then proceeded to find the Honduran government to be in breach of
its duties under the Convention and ordered it to pay compensation to the vic-
tim’s relatives.57
One must be careful, however, not to read too much into the Valasquez
Rodriguez Case with respect to the duty to prosecute violations of the Ameri-
can Convention.  In particular, it is important to note that the Court, in order-
ing remedies, did not direct the Honduran government to institute criminal
proceedings against those responsible for the disappearance of Manfredo
Valasquez, notwithstanding the fact that the lawyers for the victims’ families
                                                          
54. See 4 Inter-Am. C.H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, ¶ 174 (1988) (judgment), reprinted in 3 TRANSITIONAL
JUSTICE: HOW EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FORMER REGIMES 586 (Neil Kritz ed.,
1995).
55. See, e.g., Dianne Orentlicher, Addressing Gross Human Rights Abuses: Punishment and Victim
Compensation, in HUMAN RIGHTS: AN AGENDA FOR THE NEXT CENTURY 429 (Louis Henkin & John
L. Hargrove eds., 1995).
56. Valasquez, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, ¶ 164.
57. See id. ¶ 194(5).
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and the Inter-American Commission had specifically requested such injunctive
relief.58  Indeed, although the court said that “[s]tates must prevent, investigate
and punish any violation of the rights recognized by the Convention,” it did not
specifically refer to criminal prosecution as opposed to other forms of discipli-
nary action or punishment.
In the wake of the 1989 Valasquez judgment of the Inter-American Court,
the Inter-American Commission revisited the question of the permissibility of
amnesty laws in cases concerning El Salvador, Uruguay, and Argentina.59  In all
three cases, the Commission determined that the amnesties were incompatible
with the American Convention’s right to a remedy (Article 25) and right to ju-
dicial process (Article 8), read together with Article 1’s obligation to ensure
rights.60  The rationale applies only to countries in which the amnesty affects the
domestic law right to initiate or participate in public criminal process and which
forecloses civil redress, which is intimately tied to criminal prosecution.61
The Inter-American Commission took its position a step farther in a 1996
decision concerning a complaint against Chile for failing to repeal the military
regime’s 1978 “self-amnesty” and its consequent failure to prosecute cases of
disappearances, summary and extrajudicial executions, and torture.62  In that
case, Chile’s new democratic government had established an investigative
commission, which issued a public report and awarded the following compensa-
tion to families of the victims:  a pension not less than the average for Chilean
families; expedited procedures to declare a presumption of the victim’s death;
special attention from the State with regard to health, education, and housing;
assistance with debts; and exemption from obligatory military service for sons
of victims.63  The Commission concluded:
The Government’s recognition of responsibility, its partial investigation of the facts
and its subsequent payment of compensation are not enough, in themselves, to fulfill
its obligations under the Convention.  … [T]he State has the obligation to investigate
all violations that have been committed within its jurisdiction, for the purpose of iden-
tifying the persons responsible, imposing appropriate punishment on them, and en-
suring adequate reparations for the victims.64
However, the Commission’s conclusion did not mean that a state must al-
ways bring prosecutions against the perpetrators of human rights crimes.
Rather, according to the Commission, there were two main defects in Chile’s
approach:  First, the state failed to conduct an investigation that specifically
identified all individual perpetrators, which consequently “made it virtually im-
possible [for the victims] to establish any such responsibility before the civil
                                                          
58. See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 45, at 31.
59. See Inter-Am C.H.R., Rept. 26/92 OEA/ser. L/V/II.82 (Sept. 24, 1992) (El Salvador); Inter-
Am C.H.R. Rept. 29/92 OEA/ser. L/V/II.82, Doc. 25 (Oct. 2, 1992) (Uruguay); Inter-Am C.H.R. Rept.
24/92 OEA/ser. L/V/II.82, Doc. 24 (Oct. 2, 1992) (Argentina).
60. See id.
61. See Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Special Problems of a Duty to Prosecute: Derogation, Amnesties,
Statutes of Limitations, and Superior Orders, in IMPUNITY AND HUMAN, supra note 45, at 62.
62. Gary Hermosilla et. al., case no. 10.843, Inter-Am C.H.R. (1988).
63. Id.at 171, ¶ 57.
64. Id. at 176, ¶ 77.
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courts.”65  Second, the state failed to take any punitive action against the perpe-
trators.66  At a minimum, this case suggests that under the general human rights
conventions a state must conduct an investigation that specifically identifies
perpetrators and must impose some form of punishment on those identified as
responsible.
C. Customary International Law:  Crimes Against Humanity
Several scholars have recently taken the position that there is a customary
international law duty to prosecute the perpetrators of crimes against humanity
and that the granting of amnesty to those who commit such crimes is a violation
of international law.67
The term “crimes against humanity” as the label for a category of interna-
tional crimes recognized under customary international law originated in the
joint declaration of the governments of France, Great Britain, and Russia of
May 28, 1915, denouncing the Turkish massacre of more than a million Arme-
nians in Turkey as constituting “crimes against civilization and humanity” for
which the members of the Turkish Government would be held responsible.68
The Charter of the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal was the first international
instrument in which crimes against humanity were codified.69  The basis for the
inclusion of crimes against humanity in the Nuremberg Charter included the
1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions, experiences, and practices in the aftermath
of World War I and the Allied declarations during World War II.  In addressing
the defense claim of ex post facto law, the Nuremberg Tribunal concluded,
“The Charter is not an arbitrary exercise of power on the part of the victorious
nations, but in the view of the Tribunal, as will be shown, it is the expression of
international law existing at the time of its creation; and to that extent is itself a
contribution to international law.”70
The Nuremberg Charter defined crimes against humanity as follows:
murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts commit-
ted against any civilian population, before or during the war, or persecutions on po-
litical, racial, or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal [that is, crimes or crimes against peace],
whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.71
                                                          
65. Id. at 173, ¶ 66.
66. See id. at 172, ¶ 63.
67. See AMERICA’S WATCH, SPECIAL ISSUE: ACCOUNTABILITY FOR PAST HUMAN RIGHTS
ABUSES 2 (Dec. 1989); M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW 492, 500-01 (1992);  Edelenbos, supra note 12, at 15; Orentlicher, supra note 9, at
2585, 2593
68. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 67, at 168.
69. See id. at 1.
70. 22 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY
TRIBUNAL 461 (1949), quoted in BASSIOUNI, supra note 67, at 120.
71. Charter of the International Military Tribunal annexed to the Agreement for the Prosecution
and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 59
Stat. 1544, E.A.S. No. 472 (entered into force August 8, 1945), as amended by the Berlin Protocol of 6
October 1995, reproduced in MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 13, at 73 n.234.
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Under the Nuremberg Charter, the only difference between war crimes and
crimes against humanity was that the former were acts committed against na-
tionals of another state, while the latter were acts committed against nationals
of the same state as that of the perpetrators.72  Both had to be committed in
connection with the war.73  While the Nuremberg Tribunal ruled that it did not
have jurisdiction over acts of persecution against German Jews committed be-
fore the beginning of the war in 1939, the judgment left unclear whether the
Tribunal believed the linkage to war to be required by international law or
merely by its charter.74
Although at least one commentator has asserted that “the post-Nuremberg
developments have failed decisively to resolve the nexus issue,”75 a quick survey
of these developments should remove any doubt that the concept of crimes
against humanity under customary international law now extends to atrocities
committed during peacetime.  First, the linkage to war was not included in the
definition of crimes against humanity contained in Control Council Law No. 10,
which was adopted after the Nuremberg Charter to provide a uniform basis for
the trial of German war criminals other than the major war criminals tried by
the Nuremberg Tribunal.76  Second, in its authoritative report on the develop-
ment of the laws of war at the conclusion of the Nuremberg and Control Coun-
cil Law No. 10 trials, the United Nations War Crimes Commission concluded
that international law may now sanction individuals for crimes against human-
ity committed not only during war but also during peace.77  Third, in the Inter-
national Law Commission’s formulation of the Principles of International Law
Recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the
Tribunal, the International Law Commission indicated that crimes against hu-
manity of the inhuman act type could be committed apart from war, while it re-
tained the restriction for crimes against humanity of the persecution type.78
                                                          
72. See Egon Schwelb, Crimes Against Humanity, 23 BRITISH Y.B. INT’L L. 206 (1946).
73. See id.
74. International Military Tribunal, reprinted in 41 AM. J. INT’L L. 172, 248 (1947).
75. Orentlicher, supra note 9, at 2590.
76. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 67, at 35.  The jurisprudence of the trials under Control Council
Law No. 10, however, was mixed on whether crimes against humanity could be committed during
peacetime.  In the Eisatzgruppen Case and the Justice Case, the courts recognized that crimes against
humanity were not limited to atrocities committed during a war.  In the Flick Case and Ministries Case,
the courts followed the precedent of the International Military Tribunal and required the connection
to war notwithstanding the differences in the Nuremberg Charter and Control Council Law No. 10.
See MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 13, at 75 n.242, 76 n.243.
77. According to the United Nations War Crimes Commission, “[there exists] a system of interna-
tional law under which individuals are responsible to the community of nations for violations of rules
of international criminal law, and according to which attacks on the fundamental liberties and constitu-
tional rights of people and individual persons, that is inhuman acts, constitute international crimes not
only in time of war, but also, in certain circumstances, in time of peace.”  HISTORY OF THE UNITED
NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAWS OF WAR COMPILED BY
THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION (1948), reprinted in BASSIOUNI, supra note 67, at
570.
78. The International Law Commission (“ILC”) is a group of 34 distinguished international legal
experts elected by the United Nations General Assembly with a mandate to encourage “the progres-
sive development of international law and its codification.”  NEW ZEALAND MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL
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Fourth, the 1968 Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations
to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity provides in Article I that such
limitations do not apply to “[c]rimes against humanity whether committed in
time of war or in time of peace.”79  Finally, the Secretary-General’s Report on
the Statute of the Yugoslavia Tribunal, which was prepared by the United Na-
tions Office of Legal Counsel on the basis of rules that were considered to be
“beyond doubt customary international law,” stated that international law now
prohibits crimes against humanity “regardless of whether they are committed in
an armed conflict.”80  This statement was confirmed by the first decision of the
Appeals Chamber of the Yugoslavia Tribunal, which stated, “The obsolescence
of the nexus requirement is evidenced by international conventions regarding
genocide and apartheid, both of which prohibit particular types of crimes
against humanity regardless of any connection to armed conflict.”81
The Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,82 which
constitutes the most recent codification of crimes against humanity, grants the
Tribunal “the power to prosecute persons responsible for the following crimes
when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civil-
ian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds:  (a)
murder; (b) extermination; (c) enslavement; (d) deportation; (e) imprisonment;
(f) torture; (g) rape; (h) persecutions on political, racial, and religious grounds;
                                                          
RELATIONS AND TRADE, 1992 UNITED NATIONS HANDBOOK 25 (1992).  In 1947, the United Nations
General Assembly directed the ILC to “formulate the principles of international law recognized in the
Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal.”  U.N. G.A. Res. 177 (II),
Nov. 21, 1947.  In 1950, the ILC adopted and submitted to the General Assembly the Nuremberg Prin-
ciples, which included the following formulation on crimes against humanity:  “Murder, extermination,
enslavement, deportation and other inhuman acts done against any civilian population, or persecutions
on political, racial or religious grounds, when such acts are done or such persecutions are carried on in
execution of or in connection with any crime against peace or any war crime.”  BASSIOUNI, supra note
67, at 480.
79. Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes
Against Humanity, 754 U.N.T.S. 73.
80. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808
(1993), 3 May 1993, U.N. Doc. S/25704, reproduced in MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 13, at 81 n.260.
The submission of the Commission of Experts established by Security Council Resolution 780, as well
as the submissions of other organizations and states, expressed the view that the Yugoslavia Statute
should define crimes against humanity irrespective of armed conflict.  No state or organization took
the position that crimes against humanity under international law could be committed only during war.
See MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 13, at 82 n.262.  The actual statute, however, provides that the Tri-
bunal has jurisdiction over crimes against humanity only “when committed in armed conflict.” See id.
at 13 (article. 5).  This restriction was a result of the context in which the Yugoslavia Tribunal was cre-
ated, rather than a reflection of a rule of customary international law.  See id. at 83-84.
81. Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, U.N. International
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humani-
tarian Law Committed in the Territory of Former Yugoslavia since 1991, Case No. IT-94-1 at 72, Oct.
2, 1995.
82. The Rwanda Tribunal was created by the U.N. Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of
the U.N. Charter, in response to continuing reports of “genocide and other systematic, widespread and
flagrant violations of international humanitarian law committed in Rwanda.”  U.N. S.C. Res. 955,
SCOR (1994).
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and (i) other inhumane acts.”83  This definition of crimes against humanity con-
tains four general criteria, namely:  the acts must be inhumane in character,84
widespread or systematic,85 directed against a civilian population, and commit-
ted on national, political, ethnic, racial, or religious grounds.86
The first criterion distinguishes crimes against humanity from lawful acts
(for example, imprisonment or deportation) done pursuant to a valid judicial or
administrative decision following a full and fair hearing.  The second criterion
requires that the inhumane acts be widespread or systematic rather than iso-
lated inhumane acts or random acts of violence.  The third criterion indicates
that crimes against humanity are restricted to inhumane acts committed against
civilians as distinguished from members of the armed forces.  The fourth crite-
rion, which includes acts committed on political grounds, highlights a critical
difference between crimes against humanity under customary international law
and the crime of genocide which the Genocide Convention defines to exclude
acts directed against “political groups.”
Traditionally, those who committed crimes against humanity, were treated,
like pirates, as hostis humani generis (an enemy of all humankind), and any
state, including their own, could punish them through its domestic courts.87  In
the absence of a treaty containing the aut dedere aut judicare (extradite or
prosecute) principle, this so called “universal jurisdiction” is generally thought
to be permissive, not mandatory.  As noted above, however, several commenta-
tors have recently taken the position that customary international law not only
establishes permissive jurisdiction over perpetrators of crimes against human-
ity, but also requires their prosecution and conversely prohibits the granting of
                                                          
83. Id. at Article 2 (paragraphing omitted).  This definition departs slightly from that contained in
the Statute of the Yugoslavia Tribunal. It replaces the phrase “when committed in armed conflict,
whether international or internal in character, and directed against any civilian population” found in
the article on crimes against humanity in the Statute of the Yugoslavia Tribunal with the phrase “when
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population on national, po-
litical, ethnic, racial, or religious grounds.”
84. This is indicated by the phrase “other inhumane acts.”  The canon of construction known as
ejusdem generis suggests that the listed crimes preceding “other inhumane acts” must be construed to
be limited to things of the same kind.  The crimes listed include all of the inhumane acts enumerated in
the Nuremberg definition, with the addition of three inhuman acts that were expressly recognized as
being of such gravity as to qualify as crimes against humanity in Control Council Law No. 10, namely,
imprisonment, torture, and rape.  See BASSIOUNI, supra note 67, at 35.
85. Although the phrase “widespread or systematic” does not appear in the Nuremberg Charter, it
is synonymous with the phrase “committed against any civilian population” as used in the Nuremberg
definition.  See Schwelb, supra note 72, at 191 (concluding that the phrase any civilian population
“indicates that a larger body of victims is visualized and that single or isolated acts committed against
individuals are outside its scope”).
86. The requirement that the attack must be on “political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds,” is
drawn from the Nuremberg Charter’s reference to “persecutions.”  This requirement was not included
in the Statute of the Yugoslavia Tribunal, and an argument can be made that it unnecessarily blurs the
distinction between the two different types of crimes against humanity recognized at Nuremberg,
namely, inhumane act-type crimes and persecution-type crimes.  On the other hand, the drafters may
have meant for this requirement merely to clarify that crimes against humanity are restricted to acts
committed as part of state action or policy.  See BASSIOUNI, supra note 67, at 248-50.
87. See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 45, at 25.
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amnesty to such persons.88
Customary international law, which is just as binding upon states as treaty
law,89 arises from “a general and consistent practice of states followed by them
from a sense of legal obligation” referred to as opinio juris.90  Under traditional
notions of customary international law, “deeds were what counted, not just
words.”91  Yet, those who argue that customary international law precludes am-
nesty for crimes against humanity base their position on non-binding92 General
Assembly Resolutions,93 hortative declarations of international conferences,94
                                                          
88. See Edelenbos, supra note 12, at 15; Orentlicher, supra note 9, at 2585, 2593; BASSIOUNI, supra
note 67, at 492, 500-01; AMERICA’S WATCH, supra note 67.
89. While customary international law is binding on states internationally, not all states accord
customary international law equal domestic effect.  A growing number of states’ constitutions not only
incorporate customary international law automatically as part of the law of the land but also grant it a
rank superior to that of domestic statutes.  See SIMMA supra note 51, at 213.  In the United States, cus-
tomary international law is deemed incorporated into the common law of the United States but is con-
sidered controlling only where there is no contrary treaty, statute, or executive act.  See, e.g., Garcia-
Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that Attorney-General’s decision to detain Ma-
riel Cuban refugees indefinitely without a hearing trumped any contrary rules of customary interna-
tional law).  For a criticism of the analysis in Garcia-Mir, see Jordan J. Paust, Paquete and the Presi-
dent: Rediscovering the Brief for the United States, 34 VA. J. INT’L L. 981, 989 (1994).
90. Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 102(2) (1987); Stat-
ute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b), 59 Stat. 1055, 1060 (1945) (noting that sources of
international law applied by the Court include “international custom, as evidence of a general practice
accepted as law”).
91. SIMMA, supra note 51, at 216.
92. See Oscar Schacter, International Law in Theory and Practice, 178 REC. DES COURS 111-21
(1982-V) (“Under the United Nations Charter, the General Assembly does not have the legal power to
make law or to adopt binding decisions except for certain organizational matters such as procedural
rules, regulations for the Secretariat and subsidiary bodies and financial decisions.”).
93. See, e.g., Declaration on Territorial Asylum, G.A. Res. 2312, 22 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at
81, U.N. Doc. A/6716 (1967) (states shall not grant asylum to “any person with respect to whom there
are serious reasons for considering that he has committed a … crime against humanity”); United Na-
tions Resolution on War Criminals, G.A. Res. 2712, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 78-79, U.N. Doc.
A/8028 (1970) (adopted by a vote of 55 in favor to 4 against with 33 abstentions) (condemning crimes
against humanity and “[c]all[ing] upon the [s]tates concerned to bring to trial persons guilty of such
crimes”), reprinted in BASSIOUNI, supra note 67, at 698; G.A. Res. 2840, 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
29), at 88, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971) (adopted by a vote of 71 in favor to none against with 42 absten-
tions) (affirming that a state’s refusal “to cooperate in the arrest, extradition, trial and punishment” of
persons accused or convicted of crimes against humanity is “contrary to the United Nations Charter
and to generally recognized norms of international law”); Principles of International Cooperation in the
Detection, Arrest, Extradition, and Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes and Crimes Against
Humanity, G.A. Res. 3074, 28 GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 79, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973) (adopted by a
vote of 94 in favor to none against with 29 abstentions) (indicating that crimes against humanity “shall
be subject to investigation and the persons against whom there is evidence that they have committed
such crimes shall be subject to tracing, arrest, trial and, if found guilty, to punishment”), reprinted in 13
I.L.M. 230 (1974); Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary
and Summary Executions, G.A. Res. 1989/65 (1989) (indicating that states shall bring to justice those
accused of having participated in extra-legal, arbitrary, or summary executions); Declaration on the
Protection of All Persons From Enforced Disappearances, G.A. Res. 47/133 (1992) (equating disap-
pearances to a crime against humanity and requiring states to try any person suspected of having per-
petrated an act of enforced disappearance).  It is noteworthy that large numbers of countries abstained
during voting on the above listed resolutions, and thereby did not manifest their acceptance of the
principles enumerated therein.
94. See, e.g., The Declaration and Programme of Action of the 1993 World Conference on Human
Rights, which affirms that “[s]tates should abrogate legislation leading to impunity for those responsi-
ble for grave violations of human rights such as torture and prosecute such violations, thereby provid-
SCHARF.FMT 04/03/98  10:41 AM
Page 41:  Autumn 1996] THE LETTER OF THE LAW 57
and international conventions that are not widely ratified,95 rather than on any
extensive state practice consistent with such a rule.
Commentators often cite the Declaration on Territorial Asylum96 as the
earliest international recognition of a legal obligation to prosecute perpetrators
of crimes against humanity.  The Declaration provides that states shall not
grant asylum “to any person with respect to whom there are serious reasons for
considering that he has committed a … crime against humanity.”  Yet, accord-
ing to the historic record of this resolution, “[t]he majority of members stressed
that the draft declaration under consideration was not intended to propound
legal norms or to change existing rules of international law, but to lay down
broad humanitarian and moral principles upon which [s]tates might rely in
seeking to unify their practices relating to asylum.”97  This evidences that, from
the onset, the General Assembly envisioned its role as advisory rather than
creating a binding duty to prosecute crimes against humanity.
To the extent any state practice in this area is widespread, it is the practice
of granting amnesties or de facto impunity to those who commit crimes against
humanity.  Indeed, no sooner had the term “crimes against humanity” been
first coined with respect to the massacres of Armenians during World War I,
than the international community agreed to an amnesty for the Turkish perpe-
trators.98  Prosecution was also forsaken after the Algerian war, when, pursuant
to the Evian Agreement of 1962, France and Algeria decided against trying
persons who had committed atrocities.99  Similarly, after the Bangladesh war of
1971, India and Bangladesh consented not to prosecute Pakistani charged with
genocide and crimes against humanity in exchange for political recognition of
Bangladesh by Pakistan.100  Finally, as mentioned above, a score of countries,
                                                          
ing a firm basis for the rule of law.”  World Conference on Human Rights, Declaration and Pro-
gramme of Action, June 1993, U.N. Doc. A/Conf./57/23, second part.
95. See, e.g., the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and
Crimes Against Humanity, done in Nov. 26, 1968, 754 U.N.T.S. 73 (entered into force Nov. 11, 1970)
(no statutory limitation shall apply to crimes against humanity, irrespective of the date of their com-
mission), reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 68 (1969).  As of December 31, 1994, the Convention had been ratified
by only 39 states.  See Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General: Status as of De-
cember 31, 1994 (1995).
96. G.A. Res. 2312, 22 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 81, U.N. Doc. A/6716 (1967).
97. 1967 U.N.Y.B. 759.
98. See Schwelb, supra note 72, at 182.  Initially, the Allied Powers sought the prosecution of those
responsible for the massacres.  The Treaty of Sevres, which was signed on August 10, 1920, would have
required the Turkish Government to hand over those responsible to the Allied Powers for trial.
Treaty of Peace between the Allied Powers and Turkey [Treaty of Sevres], art. 230, at 235, Aug. 10,
1920, reprinted in 15 AM. J. INT’L L. 179 (Supp 1921).  “The Treaty of Sevres was, however, not rati-
fied and did not come into force.  It was replaced by the Treaty of Lausanne, which not only did not
contain provisions respecting the punishment of war crimes, but was accompanied by a ‘Declaration of
Amnesty’ of all offenses committed between 1914 and 1922.”  Treaty of Peace between the Allied
Powers and Turkey [Treaty of Lausanne], July 24, 1923, League of Nations Treaty Series 11, reprinted
in 18 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (Supp. 1924).
99. See Edelenbos, supra note 12, at 13.
100. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 67, at 228-30.  During the war of Bangladesh’s independence, West
Pakistan troops killed approximately one million East Pakistanis who supported efforts to establish the
independent nation of Bangladesh.  India and Bangladesh initially agreed to bring charges of genocide
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often with the blessing of the United Nations, have granted amnesty to perpe-
trators of what ostensibly appear to fall within the definition of crimes against
humanity.
Those who take the position that there is a customary international law duty
to prosecute crimes against humanity respond to the litany of contrary state
practice by asserting that “even those states which have adopted amnesty laws
and thereby allowed impunity do not deny the existence, in principle, of an ob-
ligation to prosecute, but invoke countervailing considerations, such as national
reconciliation or the instability of the democratic process.”101  Support for this
line of reasoning can be found in the International Court of Justice’s Judgment
in the Nicaragua case102 and in the oft-cited opinion of the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit in the Filartiga case.103
There are several problems with this argument in the context of the duty to
prosecute crimes against humanity, however.  First, it is factually incorrect.  Al-
though a few of the states that have granted amnesty to the leaders of the for-
mer regime have characterized their action as an exception to the rule,104 most
never mention the existence of a rule at all.  A second problem stems from the
fact that the nature of the obligation to prosecute such crimes is purportedly
absolute.105  As a consequence, appeals to exceptions or justifications suppos-
                                                          
and crimes against humanity against 195 of the 10,000 Pakistani troops who had been captured by In-
dia.  Meanwhile, Pakistan filed a case before the International Court of Justice to compel India to re-
patriate the Pakistani troops.  Ultimately, political considerations prevailed and in 1973 Bangladesh
and India agreed not to prosecute the Pakistani prisoners in exchange for political recognition of
Bangladesh by Pakistan and the withdrawal of Pakistan’s case against India before the International
Court of Justice.  Id.
101. Edelenbos, supra note 12, at 21; cf. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 2, at 496-97.
102. The International Court of Justice attempted to come to terms with the problem of inconsis-
tency between actual practice and opinio juris as follows:
In order to deduce the existence of customary rules, the Court deems it sufficient that the
conduct of States should, in general, be consistent with such rules, and that instances of State
conduct inconsistent with a given rule should generally have been treated as breaches of that
rule, not as indications of the recognition of a new rule.  If a State acts in a way prima facie
incompatible with a recognized rule, but defends its conduct by appealing to exceptions or
justifications contained within the rule itself, … the significance of that attitude is to confirm
rather than to weaken the rule.
Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶186.
103. In Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F. 2d 876 (2nd Cir. 1980), the Court observed:
The fact that the prohibition of torture is often honored in the breach does not diminish its
binding effect as a norm of international law.  As one commentator has put it “The best evi-
dence for the existence of international law is that every actual State recognizes that it does
exist and that it is itself under an obligation to observe it.  States often violate international
law, just as individuals often violate municipal law; but no more than individuals do states de-
fend their violations by claiming that they are above the law.
Case Against Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at ¶ 186 n.15 (quoting J. BRIERLY, THE OUTLOOK FOR IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 4-5 (1944)).
104. See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 2, at 496-97 (citing examples of Chile in 1984, Uruguay in 1986,
Argentina in 1987, and El Salvador in 1987).
105. Several commentators have argued that the duty to prosecute crimes against humanity is jus
cogens, or a peremptory norm of international law, which supersedes all other principles, norms, and
rules of both international and national law.  The essential characteristic of jus cogens as a higher rule
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edly contained within the rule do not in fact confirm the rule, but rather deny
its existence and in its place assert an alternative rule that would allow amnesty
for crimes against humanity whenever justified by needs for political reconcilia-
tion.  A final problem is that the reasoning relied upon by the International
Court of Justice and the Second Circuit really makes sense only with respect to
a situation where customary law has gradually been built up through State
practice, and where instances of inconsistent conduct subsequently occur.106
The reasoning is much less convincing where, as in the case of a duty to prose-
cute crimes against humanity, the inconsistency between words and practice has
been glaring from the very beginning.107
Thus, notwithstanding an array of General Assembly resolutions calling for
the prosecution of crimes against humanity and the strong policy and jurispru-
dential arguments warranting such a rule, the practice of states does not yet
support the present existence of an obligation under customary international
law to refrain from conferring amnesty for such crimes.
D. Security Council Resolutions
The Security Council can, through a Chapter VII resolution, create binding
obligations on states to bring individuals responsible for international crimes to
justice.  The Council, for example, adopted Resolution 748, requiring Libya to
surrender to the United States or the United Kingdom for prosecution the two
Libyan officials charged with bombing Pan American Flight 103.108  A year
later, the Council adopted Resolution 837, calling for the arrest of Somali
Warlord Mohamed Farrah Aidid, who was responsible for the murder of 24
U.N.  peacekeepers.109  In addition, the Security Council resolutions establishing
the Yugoslavia and Rwanda War Crimes Tribunals110 impose an obligation on
all states that are members of the United Nations to cooperate fully with the
Tribunal, including its orders of arrest.
During the negotiation of the Dayton Accord, the Chief Prosecutor of the
Yugoslavia Tribunal, Richard Goldstone, stressed that even if the peace
agreement offered immunity to indicted war criminals, “[w]e would not be
bound by it.”  He added that the Tribunal would continue with proceedings
against such persons unless the Tribunal’s Statute was changed by the United
Nations Security Council.111  Moreover, notwithstanding any amnesty that
                                                          
is its nonderogability.  It admits of no exceptions such as force majeure or state of necessity.  See
Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Introduction, in IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 45, at 6; BAS-
SIOUNI, supra note 67, at 489-99; Orentlicher, supra note 9, at 2609.
106. See SIMMA, supra note 51, at 220.
107. See id.
108. S.C. Res. 748, SCOR (1992).
109. S.C. Res. 837, SCOR (1993).  The Council rescinded this resolution when Aidid retaliated by
stepping up attacks on U.N. troops.  See S.C. Res. 885 (1993).
110. See S.C. Res. 885, SCOR (May 25, 1993) (approving statute for the Yugoslavia Tribunal); S.C.
Res. 955 (Nov. 8,  1994) (approving statute for the Rwanda Tribunal).
111. See Roger Cohen, U.N. in Bosnia: Black Robes Clash with Blue Hats, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25,
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might have been included in the Dayton Accord, the parties to the Accord
would still be bound by their obligations to arrest and surrender indicted war
criminals to the Tribunal.
Whether such an obligation applies to the NATO Peace Implementation
Force (“SFOR”) is an open question.  SFOR has reportedly come across in-
dicted war criminals on several occasions, yet has failed to arrest them for
transfer to the Tribunal.  In August 1996, when SFOR inspectors learned that
General Ratko Mladic was inside a bunker they had planned to inspect, they
rescheduled their visit rather than confront the indicted war criminal.  In March
of 1996, Amnesty International sent an Open Letter to SFOR Commanders
and Contributing Governments, which argued that SFOR’s failure to search for
and arrest indicted war criminals was a violation of Security Council Resolution
827.  Legal Counsel to SFOR responded that there is no such obligation on
IFOR since the obligation is on the states, not NATO, and SFOR “is not an oc-
cupying force in Bosnia.”112  This rationale, however, seems to fly in the face of
Article 48(2) of the Charter of the United Nations, which requires members to
carry out the decisions of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Char-
ter “directly and through their action in the appropriate international agencies
of which they are members,” which would include NATO.
III
CONCLUSION
David J. Scheffer, the U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues,
recently remarked that “one must understand, amnesty is always an option on
the table in these negotiations.”113  The above discussion indicates that Ambas-
sador Scheffer is largely correct in that there are frequently no legal constraints
to the negotiation of an amnesty for peace deal.  This is because the procedural
law imposing a duty to prosecute is far more limited than the substantive law
establishing the underlying international offenses.
Yet there are occasions where negotiators cannot legally consider an am-
nesty.  Where atrocities occur during an international armed conflict, the Ge-
neva Conventions require prosecution; where mass violence is directed at eth-
nic, national, racial, or religious groups, the Genocide Convention requires
prosecution; and where persons under color of law commit acts of torture in a
country that is a party to the Torture Convention, the Convention requires
prosecution.  Any amnesty conferred in those limited circumstances would con-
stitute a violation of treaty law and would be subject to challenge in a variety of
domestic and international fora.
While the international criminal conventions are limited in their applica-
                                                          
1995, at A3.
112. Col. Frederick Michael Lorenz, Peace Operations and War Criminals: Testing the Limits of
Military Force (Nov. 17, 1996) (unpublished paper on file with author).
113. Remarks by David Scheffer at International Law Weekend (Nov. 2, 1996).
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tion, there is growing recognition of a duty for states to do something to give
meaning to the human rights enumerated in the Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, and the
American Convention on Human Rights, which are much more likely to be ap-
plicable in a broad variety of situations.  Yet, the “something” required is not
necessarily prosecution of former leaders responsible for violations of these
general human rights treaties.  Given the precedent discussed earlier, it is likely
that the Committee on Human Rights, the European Court of Human Rights,
and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights would all agree that measures
short of prosecution—such as establishment of an investigative commission
which specifically identifies perpetrators and victims, non-criminal sanctions
against responsible officials and military personnel, and judicial redress for vic-
tims—would be adequate to discharge the duty to ensure human rights.
Customary international law recognizes permissive jurisdiction to prosecute
persons responsible for crimes against humanity either nationally or before an
international tribunal.  Yet, despite, a large collection of General Assembly
Resolutions calling for prosecution of crimes against humanity, and notwith-
standing the forceful arguments of several international legal scholars, state
practice does not yet support the existence of an obligation under international
law to refrain from conferring amnesty for crimes against humanity.  That the
United Nations, itself, has felt free of legal constraints in endorsing recent am-
nesty for peace deals underscores this conclusion.
Once it is recognized that there is a gap in the international law requiring
prosecution, two approaches are possible:  one is to exploit the gap, the other is to
attempt to fill it.  This dichotomy is manifest in the gulf between the human rights
machinery of the United Nations and the peacemaking functions centered in the
Secretary-General’s Office and the Security Council.114  Given the strong policy
reasons to disfavor amnesties which are articulated by the other articles in this
symposium issue, instead of brokering or endorsing amnesty-for-peace deals, the
Security Council should play a preemptive role in situations in which it has be-
come involved by providing in a Chapter VII resolution that no amnesty for the
perpetrators of crimes against humanity shall be permitted or internationally re-
spected.  Likewise, the statute of the proposed permanent international criminal
court should make clear that national amnesties will not be considered as a le-
gitimate factor in the exercise of its prosecutorial discretion.115
                                                          
114. See Naomi Roht-Arriaza, in IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 45, at 300.
115. As the Prosecutor of the Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal, Richard Goldstone, stressed: In-
ternational justice requires that the decision to prosecute be made “without regard to political consid-
erations or consequences.”  See MICHAEL P. SCHARF, BALKAN JUSTICE: THE STORY BEHIND THE
FIRST INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIAL SINCE NUREMBERG 89 (1997).
